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Join Dr. Richard Weinblatt, The Cop Doc, on the radio show that covers police and crime topics. This episode features Police Trainer Roy Bedard and Baltimore ACLU Attorney David Rocah weighing in on the controversy surrounding the Anthony Graber case with the Maryland State Police. An admitted motorcycle speeder, Graber was charged with violating Maryland’s wiretapping laws for video and audio taping a Maryland State Trooper on a traffic stop and putting the video up on youtube.com

By:Roy Bedard

July 10, 2005… The Watts section of Los Angeles is about to experience another tragic event in a long history of tragic events dating back to the 1960s. The police are going to be involved in a high profile incident after being scene of a deranged gunman, high on cocaine who is holding his nineteen month old daughter Suzie Marie hostage. When the proverbial smoke clears, it will become, as it often does a national media event. There will be analysis followed by more analysis; everything from sound-bite teaser nightly news to partially constructed ‘first reports’ to long and lasting political commentary that will remain housed on internet servers for years. This case will be discussed in academies, studied in colleges and Universities, debated in pubs and barrooms and presented to a court for both a civil and criminal hearing. Still, there will never be a consensus about what happened, why it happened or how it should have happened differently from the way it actually did. Jose Raul Pena is no typical father and he has created a situation that will challenge the sensibilities of every police officer that will respond to his scene. He is a car dealer soldier from El Salvador who on this day has filled himself with liquor and cocaine and is barricaded along with Suzie Marie in his auto dealership. He has just called the mother of his daughter, and after arguing with her on the phone he threatening kill himself and Suzy Marie.

The LAPD SWAT team has responded to barricaded subjects many times in the past. They have trained for the routine, the contingencies, and the exigencies. They are tempered by the flames of experience. Satirically one might say, “ good at it”.
But when Pena begins firing shots at the officers, hitting one of them and sending the community into a spiraling chaos they do as they were trained…they fire back. Who would guess that Pena would hold Suzy Marie in front of his body as a shield? Who would imagine such moral perversion or could prepare for such cold-blooded callousness? In the end, both Pena and his daughter lie dead, killed by
police bullets and once again the circus will come to town Watts…

If you go to Google.com and type in “Use of Force Expert”, my name pops up. For a while it was number one, but now it drifts among the first couple pages competing for a ‘high rank’ with other firms and professionals who make a business out of explaining police tactics and techniques to the media, attorneys, human rights, groups, etc.
On July 11, 2005 a reporter with CBS affiliate KFWB Radio Los Angeles did exactly that; he Googled me. He called me for an opinion about this case and asked me to discuss the police tactics used in this incident. Not having all of the facts, as things were still being sorted out, I was at first reluctant to answer. Rather than giving a play-by-play account of this incident, I chose rather to discuss our professional model for using force. Though different from state-to-state, philosophically most models are identical in theory of escalating and de-escalating levels of force.
Laying out the framework of resistance and response I explained the transactions that dictate what is “allowed” under case law and State statute. Using Garner v Tennessee I explained in detail how the use of deadly force is attached to our fourth amendment concerns for ‘reasonableness’. As is common, even for professionals, I got on a diatribe, accusing Pena of being in the words of LA Chief Bratton a “bad man” when the reporter interrupted me saying; “but Pena was holding his daughter in front of him…why did the police shoot?” I paused.
I explained that the shooter was reportedly firing at the police, and in fact had hit one of the officers. The community was under siege with neighbor’s homes and lives being threatened every time Pena pulled the trigger. Those officers needed to stop the threat. “yes”, he said, “but Pena was holding his
nineteen month old daughter in front of him…is it okay to shoot through her? followed by, “She was shot in the head you know?””…Again, I paused…
Suzy Marie had become from an analytical perspective, a variable, something to consider along with all of the other variables that validate or invalidate use of force decisions. It is the ‘totality of circumstances’ that drive use of force decision making, and it is the variables that often transcend the
simplicity of a force matrix. Suzy Marie was a mitigating factor to a clear cut case of deadly force.

Police officers are not computers, but at times they operate like them. They must constantly compute new data and figure out how the data interfaces against their internal algorithms. Like in a computer, these algorithms are codes, strings of ‘if/then’ scripting that set into motion a variety of reactions that determine an outcome. Officers count on these algorithms to be flexible enough to work in any given situation. But what happens when a nineteen month old baby, held as a shield is suddenly presented as a new data set?

To understand why officers do what they do, we have to understand the power of training; how it creates these algorithms in the minds of new and advanced police andcorrections personnel.

The force continuum was an early attempt to create a mental algorithm for police officers in the 1980s. A basic ‘if/then’ formula that simplified the thinking process to a set of standard variables became the basis for use of force instruction nationally and even globally.
Borrowed from an earlier military model which suggested certain rules of engagement as appropriate responses to
perceived threats, the force continuum found a quick following in civilian applications by a profession struggling to describe ‘reasonableness’.
After the landmark Supreme Court case of Graham v Connor, experts who were aware of this military model, shaped and redefined it conceptually by matching perceived threats in the field to appropriate force responses in order to satisfy the
requirement of “objective reasonableness” expressly stated by the Court. It is important to understand that the continuum was a construction of the executive branch of government; it was not gleaned from any particular judicial requirement and was certainly not a legislative mandate. It happened from the inside. It was our thing, but it was soon to become much bigger.
With so many different hands and minds working on the development of the original continuum of force for civilian
enforcement, it is impossible to know the exact purpose of its original design. Was it intended as a training tool, to express what is reasonable to entry-level and in-service personnel? Was it a chart for attorneys to draw articulated defenses for officers who are brought up on excessive force claims? Was it a policy item for agencies to express the dos and don’ts of force? Or was it meant to be all these things, as it has become? Where we can’t be sure of its exact purpose, what we can be sure of is its current use. We know that the continuum is many different things to many different people, often with competing interests. The continuum has become a part of the police culture, cited in legal documents, academic textbooks and training curriculum. And though an invention having no legal basis, it is now firmly entrenched in the American consciousness to the degree that many agencies nearly consider it law.

In 2008, the State of Florida opted to get rid of the force matrix as a training tool. This was no willy-nilly decision, no;
it was debated for mind-numbing hours by the FDLE Curriculum Staff, a variety of subject matter experts from throughout the State, FDLE attorneys and the Commission. What started as a lightning rod for controversy, grew in consensus until finally, it was done, and Florida emerged ‘matrix free’.
To understand what happened and why it happened requires that you first step back and take a fresh look at our matrix, to realize what it actually says, what is there in black and white. Forget about all of the added descriptions levied upon it by trainers attempting to make it work, look at it in its raw and unadulterated design ; a working model of force, with six
recommended responses to six perceived levels of resistance.

Excessive force…

Upon closer inspection of these categories what we see is a reflection of 1950’s style policing, the exact era that the
continuum was designed to combat. For example, Consider this fictitious dialog from Sterner v. Hillsborough, a case in which a quadriplegic was dumped from his wheelchair onto the floor of the Hillsborough County Jail booking room
by a Correctional officer. Though this case hasn’t played out yet and in fact may never be filed it reminds us of how
troublesome our Matrix is.

Use of force expert: “I wasn’t shocked when on January 29th, 2008 Mr. Sterner, a quadriplegic was dumped from his

wheelchair onto the floor by Hillsborough County Correctional officers after he refused to stand. It was shocking of course to the layman who doesn’t understand the complexities of our force matrix. But to a trained professional,(holding up the Florida Force Matrix) a look at level three passive resistance, which Mr. Sterner was clearly offering, this resistance was simply being countered by an effective ‘take-down’, a level three response, and completely within the recommended standards of this profession.”

Experts and attorney’s look at things this way, and why  shouldn’t they? They have been instructed in the rules of engagement by the very occupation that now falls prey to its own standards. It is true that a Matrix, drafted to be more concrete, creates concrete thinking. It removes critical thinking from the equation and creates a new battleground in which we find it impossible sometimes to side with ourselves. It is not shocking to me that officers Tazer eight year olds or that police beat resistors with batons as they struggle to get away. Eight year olds are perfectly capable of exhibiting aggressive behavior, and hitting people with batons for merely running away is a perfectly acceptable level four response to a level four resistance. It’s all there in the Matrix, it’s more than ok, it’s recommended.
Uncle!….Knowing when to quit
Some argue that to get rid of the Matrix you abandon the model for knowing equitable responses to resistance. In a
model I like to call the “sandlot mentality”, it becomes apparent that there is something germane to our thinking that
causes us to remain equitable in force exchanges, without the benefit of instruction. There is significant compelling evidence to show that members of any given species are hardwired to not cause major or deadly injuries to other members of the same species. In the past several years the profession has begun to realize that it is far more difficult to teach an officer how to injure or kill, then it is to teach one how not to.

What we know about conflict and combat begins when we are very young. It’s the “sandlot” where most kids learn their life lessons; that place in the neighborhood where all of the other kids gather, unsupervised by adults to learn, explore and grow. It is also the area where they experiment with conflict and conflict resolution, uninhibited and unguided by the wisdom  of preclusive adults. Sandlots are a domain, a microcosm where social hierarchy is formed, where children struggle for dominance, respect, and likeability. Recall an incident where as a child you found yourself in conflict with another child, say on the playground, or in the sandlot. Thinking back to that episode it is likely that you can recall your first experience with a natural continuum of force. Your fight probably started with name calling (verbal), quickly progressed to pushing or grabbing (empty hands), might have escalated to throwing hands in an attempt to knock
down the offender (temporary incapacitation), and might have even involved the use of a weapon, like a baseball, Tonka
truck or stick. Throughout the ordeal, which may have lasted only a couple of seconds, neither you nor your antagonist were seriously injured; and more than likely when someone screamed “uncle” the fight ended. Someone had taken control and the entire event de-escalated. This kind of event is played out every day, throughout the world. It is normal behavior and needs no instruction.

Of course this is an over simplified model of a force matrix, but it serves the point of describing how we are probably
spending too much time teaching officers what they intrinsically already know. Humans are gregarious; they don’t enjoy hurting each other. Absent that odd few, the mentally ill sadists who sometimes find their way through the hiring
process, for the most part our profession hires and trains extraordinarily decent people who enter the profession with
passion and compassion for others.

Over classification

The Matrix is a classification tool that attempts to package behaviors and tools into defined categories. To appropriately judge an officer’s use of force requires that we factor in the totality of circumstances. It is the intangibles, like stress, fear and fatigue that significantly influence behavior during the critical moment when force will be used, but these are not accounted for in the Matrix. Our solution?..to add yet another component into the equation which we refer to as Subject/Officer factors. Confused yet?

For instance, an officer addressing level four resistance, after a six block foot chase in the Florida heat, while wearing a ballistic vest and a non-breathable polyester uniform may suddenly decide that if he catches a subject, this is no longer a
level four encounter. He is exhausted, over-heated, out-of shape and about to fight. He escalates to a level five response.
Can we blame him? No, at this moment, we let him slip out of the Matrix and respond based on the Subject/Officer factors. In other words, the Matrix doesn’t really matter. And what about the tools we carry? The Matrix linearly describes injury potential within its categories. It lines up the defenses of the officer from least to greatest and leaves him with the impression that the use of some defense is more or less dangerous and extreme to the offender. But we know in the field that the use of a firearm, pointing and not shooting for instance, may not necessarily represent the use of deadly force while the use of empty hands or batons may. Our Matrix is an advanced game of ‘paper, scissors, rock’ where we suggest that one weapon always defeats another. In the real world it isn’t the weapon that matters, it is how one uses the weapon that determines its core value, its effectiveness and its injury potential.

Teaching an officer how to operate within this biosphere of intent, stress, fear, fatigue, perceived action/reaction and weapon selection should be the goal of every force trainer and it is undermined by a concrete force matrix.
Stymieing progress
For some, the matrix has become “policy by proxy”. This was never the intent of the force matrix put out by CJSTC. Oddly, some agencies in the State of Florida refuse to operate outside of the CJSTC academy level Matrix, going so far as to suggest that any technique not approved by FDLE cannot be taught inservice!
When one recalls that the basic recruit course is a minimum standard it is easy to see how our State suffers by the adoption of this simple training tool as a department policy. Yet it happens, and it is feared that it will continue to happen so long as the Matrix exists.

This may be the greatest reason for eliminating the Matrix, because of its misuse. The State of Florida is not tasked with policy development for police and corrections agencies. In fact, in-service policy development is not within its purview. Legislatively, the job of the CJSTC is to develop minimum standards; to turn non-professionals into professionals through the academy process. It is the job of a police department or corrections department to turn professionals into better professionals over time. This can only be done through good in-service training that allows for advanced and specialized training that goes beyond the minimum standard to meet the needs of each agencies unique job tasks.

Amounts of force vs Authority to use force

The Force matrix describes amounts of force, suggesting that our primary concern, no, rather our sole concern is in teaching officers how much force may be used against certain types of resistance. However, if you look at the data to discover where we are actually having problems in legal use of force, you can’t find many cases where officers who had the legal authority to use force, used too much of it. Where most internal affairs complaints and civil actions arise
for police use of force, we see that it isn’t the amount of force that is in question, but rather the issue of whether the officer had the authority to use any force at all!

A greatly overlooked case law that gives guidance on an officer’s authority to use force is the case Terry v Ohio which
describes that moment in which an officer can make a valid stop. Expressly stating that an officer is allowed to make a stop when he reasonably believes that a crime has, is or is about to be committed the Court implies that an officer is also allowed to use force. How much force? Any amount of force, except deadly force, unless the officer or another person’s life is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, then the officer may use that too. That part is easy.
What we have to understand is that there are many times when officers, shy of a reasonable belief that a crime has, is or is about to be committed interact with the public, and it is these times, when the authority issue not being completely
understood by the officer that their potential use of force is at its greatest liability for themselves and their agency. It is the presence of crime which grants an officer his authority to lawfully use force, an issue not even addressed by the Matrix.

Absent crime, officers are absent authority and cannot use any force at all. Unfortunately, the design of the Matrix presumes authority, giving no mention of the qualifying condition that allows force to be used, and leaving the officer with a false sense of security that they will ultimately prevail.
Summary
There are many reasons why the State’s workgroup felt the Matrix needed to be eliminated from basic recruit training. Humans are hard-wired with a complex autonomic nervous system, designed to detect danger through the process of stress and fear. They are critical thinkers that need to evaluate the rapidly changing facts and circumstances that they are presented.

They need to evaluate their transactions with the public, and recognize elements of crime, how those elements come and go with further investigation. By considering the totality of the circumstances; and the choices they face during conflict; to run, to fight, to posture, to submit, we can understand the subjective factors that determine the types of force that officers choose in that moment. Rather than a simplified if/then equation we better satisfy the Court when it characterized the subjective/objective paradox that is the Graham v Connor (490 U.S. 386 (1989)) decision. The one in which the test:
“…is whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable”
in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,
without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Where
the “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, and its calculus must embody an allowance for the fact
that police officers are often forced to make split-second
decisions about the amount of force necessary in a particular
situation.”
In our quest for a rational objective model it seems that we have overlooked the most obvious and important feature of the transaction between the officer and the suspect. It is the totality of circumstances which justifies the use of “any force
which he or she reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or herself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest.” (FSS 776.05)
I suspect that the matrix will continue to be used by certain law enforcement and corrections agencies throughout the state, and that is ok. It is a policy issue after all. I am certain that it will also be used by the Courts to describe force in a clinical way. The CJSTC’s decision to no longer recommend a matrix will not eliminate it from professional use. It is too well established and entrenched in the profession to simply ‘goaway’. However, by the Commission not recommending a specific matrix, officers entering the State’s academy will be taught the larger picture in use of force transactions. They will be trained to respond to the totality of circumstances by using reasonable and necessary tools, techniques and tactics. They will become less confused and more efficient in their decision
making.

By once again teaching the skill of critical thinking, we will likely see fewer incidents of wrongful uses of force and we
will engender a model for greater analysis to deal with all of the Suzy Maries that will undoubtedly continue to be placed
before us.

About the Author
Roy Bedard, President of RRB Systems International hasprovided instruction to law enforcement and corrections personnel since 1986. Called the “World’s Policeman” by the US Commercial Services, and cited as a Use of Force Expert by a variety of news, print, television and radio media, Roy has contributed to use of force policy, development and innovation in four continents and has helped countless professionals and laymen to understand the complexities of physical control, legal authority and governmental use of force.
Roy is a subject matter expert (SME) for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and has significantly contributed to the writing of the 2008 CMS II Defensive Tactics Curriculum for both the basic recruits and Instructor courses.

For more information go to www.rrbsystems.com or www.roybedard.com

By Anthony Cormier

SARASOTA HERALD TRIBUNE
Three weeks after Sarasota County Sheriff’s Deputy Carlos Verdoni shot Tyler Spann to death, Sheriff Tom Knight and the State Attorney’s Office cleared Verdoni of any criminal or procedural wrongdoing.

MEET THE LAW ENFORCEMENT EXPERTS
The Herald-Tribune contacted three police experts to review the investigative materials regarding the April 16 fatal shooting of 20-year-old Tyler Spann by Sarasota Sheriff’s Deputy Carlos Verdoni.

The newspaper searched for experts with deep experience in law enforcement and no connection to the case. It sought experts who have worked as front-line law enforcement officers, trained or taught others in police policies, and who have expertise in use of force issues. The newspaper paid the experts a total of $600. The experts were:

MICHAEL LYMAN, a former investigator for the Kansas Bureau of Investigation and professor at the Columbia College of Missouri. He spent 11 years as a criminal investigator and nine as a law enforcement consultant.

MELVIN TUCKER, who spent 15 years as the Tallahassee police chief and is a former FBI special agent. He holds a master’s degree in criminal justice and has consulted in dozens of criminal cases.

ROY BEDARD, a former Tallahassee police officer and widely known law enforcement consultant who trains police agencies across the world and has consulted in dozens of high-profile cases in recent years.

To varying extents, each was critical of Verdoni’s handling of portions of the incident, and they pointed to early errors that turned a prank into a deadly confrontation.

They based their observations on Sheriff’s Office policies, Florida law, Supreme Court standards and national police standards. Their findings were expressed in interviews and in two written reports.

MISTAKES MADE
A panel of law enforcement experts reviewed the April 16 fatal shooting of 20-year-old Tyler Spann of Venice by Sarasota Sheriff’s Deputy Carlos Verdoni after a door-knocking prank and determined the following errors set the stage for the fatal confrontation. The experts did not agree on all points, but generally raised the following concerns:

Spann had not committed a crime and should not have been pursued.

Verdoni broke department policy by personally involving himself in a dispute in his own neighborhood.

Verdoni should have immediately called Venice police, or asked for backup once he decided to pursue, rather than confronting Spann alone.

Verdoni rushed out of his home and was ill-equipped for a pursuit or confrontation, increasing the likelihood deadly force would be required.

The Sheriff’s Office should have opened an internal affairs inquiry, or called in an outside agency to investigate, to use the case as an opportunity to review department policies.

“Everything he did was appropriate that night,” Knight said then.

But an independent panel of law enforcement experts with no connection to the case disagrees with Knight, saying that Verdoni violated several Sheriff’s Office policies and police standards the night he chased down a suspected prankster and shot him at point-blank range during a scuffle.

The deputy’s actions before the actual shooting, they said, set the stage for a confrontation that should not have escalated to deadly force. Moments after a door-knocking prank, Spann was shot dead in the street.

In addition, the experts hired by the Herald-Tribune to review the case all say that the Sheriff’s Office erred by not initiating a formal internal affairs review or an investigation by an outside agency that would have looked at more than just the moment the shots were fired.

The experts, who had access to all available information related to the case, said that Verdoni, 33, was justified in shooting Spann, 20, after the drunken man tackled him and went for his gun.

They also said that Verdoni violated no state laws by pursuing Spann — but said that viewing the case only through the prism of legalities ignores numerous “tactical errors” that law enforcement officers are trained to avoid.

The experts’ opinions differed on certain aspects of the case. But they each questioned Verdoni’s handling of the situation when the off-duty deputy grabbed his gun, rushed out of his home in a T-shirt and sandals and chased the pranksters in his patrol car through a quiet Venice neighborhood.

Among the criticisms that they raised:

• Verdoni should not have pursued the young men because off-duty law enforcement officers are trained only to engage in pursuits when someone’s life is in danger.

• Authorities would not have been able to charge Spann with a crime because he did not commit either of the two misdemeanors — trespassing or loitering and prowling — cited by the Sheriff’s Office.

• Verdoni violated department policy by becoming involved in a neighborhood dispute in which he was emotionally involved.

• Verdoni should have immediately notified dispatchers and called for backup once the pursuit began.

• Verdoni was ill-equipped to chase Spann, wearing sandals that led to a fall and not carrying non-lethal weapons such as a Taser, pepper spray or a baton.

• The Sheriff’s Office acted too quickly in claiming Verdoni’s actions were appropriate and did not review the case with an eye toward avoiding similar situations in the future.

The experts reviewed every aspect of the case file, including interview transcripts, investigative reports, the State Attorney’s Office findings, the Shooting Review Board hearing, a sketch of the neighborhood and other documents related to the episode.

They based their conclusions on Sheriff’s Office policies, Florida law, Supreme Court standards, national police practices and their combined 50 years in law enforcement.

In addition to offering a critique of Verdoni’s actions, they questioned the swift conclusion drawn by a Shooting Review Board, the group of Sheriff’s Office officials that reviewed the same documents as the experts.

The board had two options: Order an in-depth internal affairs investigation that would have included new interviews with those involved; or deem the deputy’s actions within policy and close the case.

It took them less than two hours to take the latter path and close the case.

They did not question Verdoni, although he was in the room during the hearing. And they did not interview Spann’s friend Chris Hayes, who was there during the prank that night.

The experts said that an independent review can lead to better training techniques and policy changes that are beneficial to the agency and the public.

A recent example was when Sarasota police had the Hillsborough Sheriff’s Office look into its handling of a man who was kicked while in custody and was subsequently offered money for a quick settlement.

That inquiry was part of a top-to-bottom review of the department that led to the creation of a citizens’ panel to review complaints and officer conduct.

Given a chance to respond to the experts, top sheriff’s officials disagreed with some of the findings.

Col. Steve Burns said Verdoni made decisions on the fly that night, acting quickly to track down and capture a possible criminal.

He said that there was ample evidence to charge Spann with a crime, and that the lawman did not have time to take more equipment with him.

“To me, when you ring somebody’s doorbell and run, that’s a crime,” Burns said. “And Deputy Verdoni has every right to react to a crime.”

The Shooting Review Board ruling was met with criticism by Spann’s family and friends, who called on Gov. Charlie Crist to open an independent review.

As the governor considers the request, the Herald-Tribune sent pertinent documents to the experts and asked them to give their opinion of what happened that night.

Here is a closer look at the areas where the experts saw problems, and how the Sheriff’s Office viewed those issues:

NO REASON FOR A CHASE

What we know: In his first call to dispatch, Verdoni said he had “a male on the ground trespassing on my property.” During a later interview, he reiterated that Spann was trespassing, though he also suggested the man may have been loitering and prowling.

Sheriff’s Office findings: The shooting review board said Verdoni was within his rights to chase after Spann and Hayes because the deputy had a “reasonable suspicion” to believe they had damaged his car two weeks earlier and were trespassing by knocking on his door twice in the same night. And, during a news conference the day of the shooting, Knight said that the men also could have been charged with loitering and prowling for the ding-and-ditch prank.

Experts’ take: Two of the three experts said Spann committed no crime. They disputed the trespassing concept because he was not given a warning, as the law requires.

They challenged the review board assessment that Verdoni had “probable cause” to arrest Spann for damaging his patrol vehicle because there is no evidence that Spann or Hayes vandalized it.

They also challenged Knight’s assertion that Spann was loitering and prowling because the law says suspects must first be given a chance to “dispel the fear” caused by their actions — essentially, they have to be warned to knock it off first.

Said expert Melvin Tucker, a former FBI agent and Tallahassee police chief: “My first question is, ‘What’s the crime?’ You’ve got to have a crime to investigate and I just don’t see it. Trespassing? There’s no warning. Loitering and prowling? Again, there’s no warning for him to stop. Damaging the car? There’s no evidence, none, to suggest this young man was the one who did it.”

One of the experts, legal consultant Roy Bedard of Tallahassee, argued that Verdoni was making what is known as a “Terry stop,” based on a U.S. Supreme Court opinion that allows officers to take action without direct knowledge of a crime. In those cases, the officer must show he or she has a “reasonable suspicion” a crime has taken place or is about to.

But Bedard also maintained that accepted police practices say off-duty deputies should engage in a pursuit only if there is reason to believe that someone’s life is in danger.

In this case, Bedard said, the deputy never indicated that he thought someone was hurt or needed his help.

POLICING CLOSE TO HOME

What we know: About 11:30 p.m. on April 15, Verdoni’s infant son was startled by a doorbell. At 1 a.m., the deputy was working on his computer when someone pounded on the door.

Verdoni told detectives he chased Spann and Hayes because he feared that they could harm his family.

Verdoni said, “I didn’t want these guys to come to my house one of these nights that I’m not there and my wife be there with my 4-month-old baby.”

Sheriff’s Office findings: Sarasota Sheriff’s General Order 12.2 prohibits officers from becoming involved in their own “neighborhood squabbles” and instructs them to contact a superior if a problem arises.

Sheriff’s Colonel Burns said the policy is aimed at petty disputes, such as a branch hanging over a fence or not removing dog waste. Burns said off-duty deputies have an obligation to act if they think a crime has been committed or someone is in peril.

“This was not a neighborhood dispute,” Burns said. “This was a deputy tracking down suspects in a crime.”

Experts’ take: By his own statement, the experts all said, Verdoni was upset that his child had been startled. He was also afraid for his family’s safety and frustrated that his patrol car was damaged.

A general rule for officers, the experts said, is “Don’t police your own neighborhood.” The guidelines force officers to be objective and calm during interaction with the public.

In addition, their reliability as a witness in a criminal case can be compromised due to a conflict of interest.

“This was a tactical error,” said Roy Bedard, a former police officer and now a law enforcement consultant. “It seems as though he was afraid for his family. And the logical thing to do would be to secure his home, call the authorities and stay behind to protect his family. He didn’t do that.”

One of the experts, Michael Lyman, a former Kansas Bureau of Investigations agent, did not believe that Verdoni violated the neighborhood squabbles policy because the deputy “could not have known who these people were, whether they lived nearby or were juveniles.”

Still, Lyman says it would have been “more appropriate” to call in another agency to investigate or pursue the pranksters. “He probably should have stayed at home and waited for a response from other officers.”

A RESIDENTIAL PURSUIT

What we know: Verdoni parked his marked Chevrolet Impala patrol car in his driveway. After the second prank, he got in, turned on the spotlight and saw two people running away. Verdoni gave chase in his patrol car but did not immediately call for back-up. It was not until he found Spann and ordered him onto the ground that Verdoni called dispatch.

Sheriff’s Office findings: Deputies are not required to immediately call for backup, Burns says, and are generally expected to take control of the scene until a higher-ranking deputy arrives.

Experts’ take: All three experts said Verdoni should have called for backup immediately because he did not know whether Spann and Hayes were armed or otherwise dangerous. Officers are expected to call dispatch to let headquarters know where they are and what they are doing. This adds a layer of protection to the officer in case he or she encounters an unruly suspect.

Lyman questioned why Verdoni did not request backup or get on the radio with Venice police during the pursuit. He said it is accepted police protocol to immediately tell dispatch an officer’s whereabouts.

“What if these guys are dangerous?” Lyman asked. “He doesn’t know what he’s going to meet up with out there, so it would make sense to get on the radio as soon as possible and let dispatch know what you’re doing.”

By arriving alone, with only his gun for protection, Verdoni was left with deadly force as the only option when Spann approached him.

ON THE RUN IN SANDALS

What we know: Before rushing out, Verdoni slipped on a pair of Crocs, rubbery open-backed sandals. Later, when Spann got off the ground and attacked Verdoni, the lawman told investigators he slipped and fell because one of the sandals fell off — leading to hand-to-hand combat and leaving Verdoni to fend for himself with only his gun for protection.

Sheriff’s Office findings: Internal Affairs Chief Lt. Mike Mercurio told the review board that Verdoni did not have to follow guidelines because he was chasing a fleeing suspect. The agency would rather catch the suspect than make sure its deputies are wearing appropriate footwear, Mercurio said.

“Could he have had better shoes on? Yes,” Mercurio said. “But you have to have the totality of the circumstances surrounding this. I would think less of an officer who delayed a pursuit in search of better footwear in his residence.”

Experts’ take: This is an example of how an early mistake heightened the intensity of the situation. Because he rushed to nab the pranksters, Verdoni wore unstable sandals that put him in a precarious position in the scuffle with Spann.

Bedard and Lyman both said it was reasonable to quickly chase after a fleeing suspect but one expert questioned his footwear. “There is a reason you want officers out in boots, or at least tennis shoes,” said Tucker. “Say he gets into a footchase with this guy. He’s running in sandals? Not the best choice.”

THE PROPER TOOLS?

What we know: Verdoni kept his service pistol, a 9 mm Sig Sauer, on a coffee table by the door. When his doorbell rang the first time, he put the pistol in his rear waistband and walked outside. After the second prank, Verdoni grabbed his cell phone, car keys and gun. He did not take a gun belt, which carries handcuffs, pepper spray and a Taser.

Sheriff’s Office findings: The Sheriff’s Office has no specific policy requiring deputies to carry their gun belt or other equipment while making an off-duty arrest. Their policies dictate only that an officer should have a “firearm readily accessible in the event the need should arise.”

Experts’ take: Verdoni did not bring his gun belt and he could not put it in a holster on his waist, so the firearm remained in his hand during the entire confrontation. And because he had no other weapon besides the gun, Verdoni could not subdue Spann with a jolt from a Taser or burst of pepper spray, defenses that are lower on the use-of-force scale that tops out at deadly force. “Once again, were there other options?” Tucker asked.

Bedard and Lyman, though, defended Verdoni and said there was a great urgency for the lawman to act.

Because he did not know what Spann or Hayes were up to, he had to quickly grab three things that could aid him in his pursuit: his car keys, his cell phone and his weapon.

“Deputy Verdoni had reasonably done what he could, in the time that he had, to prepare himself for a confrontation. He grabbed his keys in order to give chase, his phone in order to communicate with others and his weapon in order to defend himself if necessary,” Bedard wrote.

Host Name: Dr. Richard Weinblatt
Show Name: TheCopDoc-Police Academy Success Tips
Click Here: Academy Success!

Date/Length: 6/22/2010 10:00 PM – 1 hr
Description:

Police Academy success is the topic for the hour LIVE on The Cop Doc radio show. Famed police training guru Roy Bedard, police academy Commander Dan Hare, and Fitness honcho Mark Prince offer tips on how to succeed in the basic law enforcement academy setting. What academic, mental, and physical fitness steps can you do to ensure that you excel in a demanding setting. In addition, The Cop Doc’s expert police training panel explores what is wrong and right with police basic training in America and what needs to be done to fix it.

Even in Oakland, Calif., where police are notorious for their brutality and duplicity, Oscar Grant’s death was remarkable. Last January, Grant — a 22-year-old black man — was handcuffed, forced face down on a subway platform under a police officer’s knee and shot by an officer in the back. Videos of the incident spawned weeks of protests by a community fed up with abusive police practices.

“Looking at it, I hate to say this, it looks like an execution to me,” Roy Bedard, who has trained police officers around the world, told the San Francisco Chronicle in the wake of Grant’s shooting. “It really looks bad for the officer.”

This week, the trial of Officer Johannes Mehserle continues. Mehserle — who’s white — is being tried for murder charges in Los Angeles, where his defense counsel moved the trial (fearing that an Oakland jury would be biased by local coverage and protests following Grant’s death).

Evidence, including several videos taken by onlookers, clearly establishes that Mehserle shot and killed Grant. Mehserle’s attorneys, however, are arguing that Grant was resisting arrest (though handcuffed and under the knee of another officer.) Mehersle’s counsel are also telling the jury that he intended to use his Taser and accidentally drew and fired his gun.

Even if Grant was resisting arrest, though — a fact that remains under dispute — two serious questions will hamper Mehserle’s defense.

First, Mehserle claims that he confused his firearm for the Tasers which he and other Bay Area police officers had been trained to use four months earlier. According to an independent expert, however, confusing one’s firearm for their Taser is “as reflexive as you getting in on … the passenger side [of your car] if you want to drive it.” Likewise, Florida criminologist and consultant Goerge Kirkham concludes, “There’s no remote similarity to a conventional firearm….The Taser is just like apples and oranges.”

The second issue hounding Mehserle’s counsel is the question of whether use of a Taser would have been appropriate in the first place. Before he was shot and killed, Grant was in handcuffs. He was forced onto his stomach by police. One officer appears to have had his knee on the back of Grant’s neck or upper back. What threat could the young man have posed?

It’s a familiar story: white police tried for excessive use of force against a black man in a Los Angeles courtroom. As a recent resident of Oakland, I’m hopeful that the outcome from Mehserle’s trial won’t spark the same kinds of riots we saw in April 1992.